HBMC 0xb4fd…0bba

HBMC is the symbol of the PulseChain token at 0xb4fd57e92483c895743503b77827948643c30bba. Flagged: the scanner found 1 high-risk pattern in the contract code and a high-risk sign in where the supply or the liquidity went. Read the findings before trading. Reflection and tax tokens trip several of the code checks by design, so a Flagged contract means "read the findings", not proof of a scam. The supply sign is measured from the token's own transfers on the chain. As of 17 Oct 2026 01:17 UTC it traded at $7,560 (+7.4% over 24 hours), with $43.7K of liquidity and $52.81 traded in the last 24 hours. A token's name and symbol are chosen by whoever deployed it, not by DexDenom.com.

Contract address

0xb4fd57e92483c895743503b77827948643c30bba

Symbol (set by its deployer)

HBMC

Name its contract reports (set by its deployer, not by DexDenom.com)

Hex Bond Millionaires Club

Price (USD)

$7,560

Change 5m / 1h / 24h

-0.4% / -1.2% / +7.4%

Market cap

$133.4K

Liquidity (TVL)

$43.7K

Volume 24h

$52.81

Groups

Jungle (no group)

Scan

Flagged

Figures computed

17 Oct 2026 01:17 UTC

Scan: Flagged

What the scanner found in the code

• High: PROXY. The address is a proxy: the real code lives at another address, and this one forwards to it. Risk: If the forwarding target can be changed, the token can be replaced with different code after you buy. An immutable clone (EIP-1167) cannot be. Harmless when: Minimal clones from a factory are immutable and normal. Upgradeable proxies are the ones to read carefully - the implementation is scanned too.
• Medium: DELEGATECALL. The contract can run code from another address in its own storage. Risk: The logic can be swapped after launch. What you read today is not what you may be trading tomorrow. Harmless when: Upgradeable contracts and proxies work this way; see the PROXY finding for whether the upgrade key is fixed.
• Medium: SECOND_ADMIN_SLOT. A permission check reads a second admin slot as well as the owner. Risk: Same idea as a hidden admin, one notch less certain: two addresses can drive the privileged functions. Harmless when: A named operator or minter role in an open, verified contract.
• Medium: HIDDEN_BALANCE_WRITE. A function outside transfer / mint / burn can change wallet balances directly. Risk: The dev can take tokens out of any wallet, or conjure tokens into their own, without a trade and without you seeing a transfer. Harmless when: Reflection and reward tokens do exactly this on purpose (excludeAccount, reflect) - the balances are recomputed, not stolen. Check which it is before deciding.
• Medium: TRANSFER_GATE. transfer() checks a per-address list before it lets a transfer through - a blacklist, whitelist or cooldown. Risk: The dev can stop you selling: add your wallet to the list, or hold everyone but themselves. This is how honeypots work - buys go through, sells do not. Harmless when: Anti-bot cooldowns at launch, or a max-wallet rule. Fine if it expires or is renounced; a gate the owner keeps forever is the honeypot switch.
• Medium: TRANSFER_SIDE_EFFECT. transfer() writes to storage that is not a balance or an allowance. Risk: Usually a tax, a counter or a last-trade timestamp - the plumbing taxes and cooldowns are built on. Not harmful by itself; it is where a changeable tax lives. Harmless when: Every tax and reflection token does this. Read the tax and whether the owner can change it.
• Medium: EXTERNAL_CALL. transfer() calls out to another contract, one whose address is stored and can be changed. Risk: Whatever that other contract does runs on every trade. Swap it for a malicious one later and every transfer can be blocked, taxed or drained. Harmless when: Reward tokens call a distributor; tax tokens call the router to swap fees. Common, but the swap-the-address part is the risk.
• Medium: TX_ORIGIN. The transfer path checks tx.origin - who started the transaction - rather than who is calling. Risk: Lets the code treat bots, routers and people differently, which is how some honeypots let the dev sell and nobody else. Harmless when: Crude anti-bot checks at launch. Old pattern, mostly a smell.

What the supply did

• the dev wallets hold 78.92% of the supply outside the pools Risk: That is supply that can be sold into the pool at any time, against everyone else.
• 99.99% of the LP tokens sit unlocked in a dev wallet - the liquidity can be pulled Risk: Whoever holds LP tokens can withdraw the pool's PLS at any moment - the classic rug pull. Nothing stops it but their word.
• 63.5% of holders never bought - they were handed tokens Risk: The holder count is padded; real demand is smaller than it looks, and handed wallets tend to sell.

Scanned 6 Oct 2026 15:42 UTC.

Its deepest pools

Open the live page Full scan report PulseChain today

Figures come from PulseChain itself, read by DexDenom.com's own node: prices from each token's pools, liquidity (TVL) as the dollar value of what its pools hold, volume over the last 24 hours, market cap as the token's totalSupply() times its price. They are recomputed every 10 to 20 minutes. A scan reports what a token's code does and where its supply went; it is not financial advice, and "Warning" means nothing was found, not that a token is safe. The live, interactive version of everything here is on DexDenom.com. This page was built 17 Oct 2026 01:25 UTC.