TSLAon 0x8622…092c
TSLAon is the symbol of the PulseChain token at 0x8622f671fe425eb2144e7978f589a279c715092c. It is in DexDenom.com's E-Copy group. Flagged: the scanner found 3 high-risk patterns in the contract code and a high-risk sign in where the supply or the liquidity went. Read the findings before trading. Reflection and tax tokens trip several of the code checks by design, so a Flagged contract means "read the findings", not proof of a scam. The supply sign is measured from the token's own transfers on the chain. As of 16 Oct 2026 21:27 UTC it traded at $339.33 (-0.5% over 24 hours), with $263.10 of liquidity and $543.82 traded in the last 24 hours. A token's name and symbol are chosen by whoever deployed it, not by DexDenom.com.
- Contract address
- 0x8622f671fe425eb2144e7978f589a279c715092c
- Symbol (set by its deployer)
- TSLAon
- Name its contract reports (set by its deployer, not by DexDenom.com)
- Tesla (Ondo Tokenized) from Ethereum
- Price (USD)
- $339.33
- Change 5m / 1h / 24h
- +0.1% / +0.3% / -0.5%
- Market cap
- $858.32
- Liquidity (TVL)
- $263.10
- Volume 24h
- $543.82
- Groups
- E-Copy
- Scan
- Flagged
- Figures computed
- 16 Oct 2026 21:27 UTC
Scan: Flagged
Flagged: the scanner found 3 high-risk patterns in the contract code and a high-risk sign in where the supply or the liquidity went. Read the findings before trading. Reflection and tax tokens trip several of the code checks by design, so a Flagged contract means "read the findings", not proof of a scam. The supply sign is measured from the token's own transfers on the chain.
What the scanner found in the code
- High: PROXY. The address is a proxy: the real code lives at another address, and this one forwards to it. Risk: If the forwarding target can be changed, the token can be replaced with different code after you buy. An immutable clone (EIP-1167) cannot be. Harmless when: Minimal clones from a factory are immutable and normal. Upgradeable proxies are the ones to read carefully - the implementation is scanned too.
- High: FAKE_RENOUNCE. The contract has a renounceOwnership / transferOwnership button, but pressing it does not actually change who the owner is. Risk: The dev can announce 'ownership renounced' and still control the token afterwards - taxes, blacklists, minting, whatever the owner-only functions allow. Harmless when: Almost never. A real renounce writes the owner slot; one that does not is there to be screenshotted.
- High: SELFDESTRUCT. The contract can delete itself. Risk: Every balance in it disappears with it. Nothing to sell into afterwards. Harmless when: Practically none for a token.
- Medium: DELEGATECALL. The contract can run code from another address in its own storage. Risk: The logic can be swapped after launch. What you read today is not what you may be trading tomorrow. Harmless when: Upgradeable contracts and proxies work this way; see the PROXY finding for whether the upgrade key is fixed.
- Medium: NOT_ERC20. transfer() or balanceOf() is missing from the function table. Risk: It may not be a token you can trade the normal way, or it hides those functions behind a proxy. Harmless when: A proxy front-end; the implementation's report should show them.
- Medium: HIDDEN_BALANCE_WRITE. A function outside transfer / mint / burn can change wallet balances directly. Risk: The dev can take tokens out of any wallet, or conjure tokens into their own, without a trade and without you seeing a transfer. Harmless when: Reflection and reward tokens do exactly this on purpose (excludeAccount, reflect) - the balances are recomputed, not stolen. Check which it is before deciding.
- Medium: TRANSFER_GATE. transfer() checks a per-address list before it lets a transfer through - a blacklist, whitelist or cooldown. Risk: The dev can stop you selling: add your wallet to the list, or hold everyone but themselves. This is how honeypots work - buys go through, sells do not. Harmless when: Anti-bot cooldowns at launch, or a max-wallet rule. Fine if it expires or is renounced; a gate the owner keeps forever is the honeypot switch.
What the supply did
- the dev wallets have sold 111.33% of the supply into a pool Risk: The dev is taking money out. Past a point, buyers are the exit liquidity.
- 99.99% of the LP tokens sit unlocked in a dev wallet - the liquidity can be pulled Risk: Whoever holds LP tokens can withdraw the pool's PLS at any moment - the classic rug pull. Nothing stops it but their word.
- 87.3% of holders never bought - they were handed tokens Risk: The holder count is padded; real demand is smaller than it looks, and handed wallets tend to sell.
- the top ten non-dev holders hold 57.42% of the supply outside the pools Risk: Any one of them can move the price a long way in one sell.
Its contract code is identical to 1 other token DexDenom.com has scanned; 1 of them lost most of their liquidity within 7 days of launch.
Scanned 6 Oct 2026 15:39 UTC.
Its deepest pools
| Paired with | Liquidity | Volume 24h | Created | Pool |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WPLS PulseX V2 | $162.73 | $505.09 | 21 Sep 2026 | 0x58c5…aae8 |
| pTSLA PulseX V2 | $71.69 | $9.32 | 22 Sep 2026 | 0xc10a…560d |
| EXTRM PulseX V2 | $28.44 | $30.78 | 21 Sep 2026 | 0x5984…83e3 |
| CV PulseX V2 | $0.1162 | - | 29 Sep 2026 | 0xa611…6337 |
| pMINT PulseX V2 | $0.1078 | - | 29 Sep 2026 | 0xbe1d…fec4 |
| PBP PulseX V2 | $0.02775 | $0.004031 | 1 Oct 2026 | 0x76e9…0173 |
Open the live page Full scan report PulseChain today
Figures come from PulseChain itself, read by DexDenom.com's own node: prices from each token's pools, liquidity (TVL) as the dollar value of what its pools hold, volume over the last 24 hours, market cap as the token's totalSupply() times its price. They are recomputed every 10 to 20 minutes. A scan reports what a token's code does and where its supply went; it is not financial advice, and "Warning" means nothing was found, not that a token is safe. The live, interactive version of everything here is on DexDenom.com. This page was built 16 Oct 2026 21:31 UTC.